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Of all the benefits derived from cultivated social
life and advanced civilization one of the most important and
far-reaching in its effect is the right of testamentary
disposition.

When a man tter long years of diligance

has accuulated property the acquisition of which has perhaps -been the end and aim of his life, arrives at the point
of, death. his natural inquiry will be, *and what shall beicome of my worldly possessions, is the labor of years :in
vain, is my property to rrvert again

to the common stock,

to be owned by him who ma

acquire the samebyforce of

chance or might ?N

A natrual sense of justice, com-

mon to- all men however degenerate will revolt against such
a principal.

Where men are bound together by the ties of

family or of friendship there is the admitted right of one
to confer upon another his property, when and in what manner
he will.
the products

If during his life a man can bestow upon another
of his labor why at his death should he be

denied the same privilege.

It is difficult to conceive of

a society so barbaric as would favor the reversion of a

man's property to the common stock.

The strife and con-

fusion which would result from a mad scramble for the
spoils of the death bed, would cause revulsion in the most
degenerate mind.

To satisfy a connnon sense of justice tp

sustain the peace and harmony of society, the right of the
possessor upon his death to direct the disposition of his
property has been evolved from the almost absolute
ity of things.

necess-

And with some restrictions society has

given to the proprietor the right upon his own death to
dispose of his property in what manner he

chooses,

and to vest his goods in certain persons to the exclusion
of all others.
a man'

Society has provided for the disposition of

property in case he fails to avail himself of this

privilege, .bi/t a discussion of what Mr.

Schouler calls,

'the will of the state" as distinguished from the will of
the testator, is not pertinet to this discussion.
The abuse of the testamentary power~possessed by a
sane man.1is guarded against by the natural and instinctive
affection existing between him and those to whom he is bound

a
by ties of blood or marr~iage.
Disposition of property to take effect at one's
death is called a will or testament which terms we
now use synor&ously.

may

Wills have kept pace with civilza-

To the most degenerate society perhaps -they were

tion.
unknown.

When society was nomadic, a man's only possess-

ion being

movable of coursewills were confined to that

species of property.

As society progressed and as real

property became a subject of private and individual ownership provision -was made for wills to embrace it;

And thus

has the law slowly broadened down the centuries.
AThe earliest according to some authorities was
'Noah's rTestament made in writing and witnessed under his
swal, whereby he disposed of the whole world.

Among the

ancient Hebrews we find Abraham complaining that 1-) unless
he had children of his body at his death his steward Eliezer
of Damascus would be his heir.

Many writers think this is

quite conclusive to show he had made him so by will.

4
Isaac gives his deathbed blessing to his younger son by an
error which he refuses upon his discovery to retract.
Blackstone thought that the earliest authentic instance of
testamentary disposition was Jacob's bequest whereby he gave
his son Joseph a portion of his estate double that given to
-his brethern.

All these seem to afford instances of

death bed dispositiong-at patriarchial discretion.
It 19y appears altogether likely that "verbal test-aments preceded- written ones.

In the primitive ages of

many nations formal wills were unknown.

This was the case

with the .ancient Oermane/and also with the Athenians before
-the age of Solon.

The sanctity of the family relation and

the right to the absolute

possession of property in a more

advanced civilization changed this and introduced the use
of testaments.
Tables

Withb the introduction of the

Twelve

at Rome came an unlimited right of the Romand citi-

zen to dispose of his property.

This was afterwards

qualified and the observance of certain formalities was
,required,

such as the presence of five witnesses and the

5
will was in the f orm of a purchase.
of the requisiteawitnesses

Afterwards the number

was incresed to seven.

Under Justinian the testator's right of disposition was
restricted b.,,: a provision that he should in no cqse totally disinherit his children.

It appears that the right of

making a formal will and disposing of property Ffter
death is me,'ely a creature of the civil state,which was
expre

ly grante A in some Qtates,while in others it was per-

mitted by the acquiesence of society.

Where it is per-

mitted by law it is subjected to different formalities
and restrictions in almost every natfonbut the end isthe
same

To permit a man to do what he will with his own.

The right of diposing of one's property after death is a
reasonable and natural right, so we may conclude it existed
to a certain extent everywhere and at all times.
The re4son for laws and legislation on this subject,
the reqziring of certain formalities and the imposing of
limitations,is to prevent a testator from unjust

iscrimi-

nation against those who ought to be the object of his bounty,

and for the further purpose of securing uniformity in

6

order that the courts may be able to interpret the will
and carry out the intention of the testator.
It

is impossible to discover when testamentary

disposition was first made in England.
have existed in the

It

appears to

arliest times but not without serious

restrictions which were not altogether removed until recent
years.

'he church always favored the restriction on the

disposition of personal property.

uring the reign of

Henry II only one third of the personal property could be
willed away. The feudal tenure which e xisted after the Norman
Conqi st made the disposition of real property impossible
save with the c onsent, of the Lord.

Three statutes during

,

thp r-beign of Henry VIII did much towards relievinvg this
disability and during Charles II all traces of feudal tenure were abolished and by the statute of Wills passed in 1827
during the reign of the present queen of England all restrictions were removed from
w, real or personal.

the disposition of property wheth-

The law as it existed in England was

k troduced into this country by our ancestors with such
restrictions and modifications as were deemed expedient.

7
As new

ircumstances presented themselves it has been found

necessary to make various changes and now we have a complete set of statutory rules the requirments of which seem
plain and simple but have however been the source of constant controversey.
Man's property is his own until he disposes of it.
One can only alienate property by delivery, by virtue of a
contract or in the execution of a gift.

A contract and an

executed gift each presuppose two parties, a grantor and a
0

,g&an+,ee.

A will cannot be an executed gift during the

life. of the tes+,ator for it is only made to +,take effect at
his*fdeath, nor is it a contract for it lacks mutuality' of
mind.since.these are" the only methods of placing property
bxyond the owner's control, he cannot bind his subsequent
actions by conveying that property by will as that woild
presuppose the

cntrol to have passed out of his hands.

Therefore a will irrevokable in terms is none the less revokable during the +estator's life;
In speaking of the suhject Lord Bacon said,'It would
be for -aman to deprive himself of that which by all things
is most incident to human condition and that is alienation

8

or repentance.'

Hence when a testator states this to be
must necessarily be a

his last will and testament it

counter mand or revokation of all or so much of the former
will as is in conflict with or contrary to the last deelaration of the testator'smind.
This is clearly stated
Claffy 45 Barb. 438,

'

in the case of Timon vs.

A testator has the right when in a

full possession when in the full possession of his faculties
to destroy his own will at any time or in any mfr-ner he
and no fraud can be committed by any person in des-

pleases,

troying or assisting to d'estroy a will by the express direction and in the presnnce

of the testator, though it

is

not done in the presence of two witnesses so as to revoke
it.'
What amounts to a Revolation.
At first ali-most any act that showed an intention
to revoke a will would have that effect.

The

result has been the same as with the f ormalities required in
making the will which as civilzation advanced has been
stricter,

and to-day there is

a general and uniform system1

9
In primitive times a parol rovocation would be effectual
as it
mind.

was regarded as the declaration of the testator's
However it

must have been a present revocation in

the presence of three witness.

A parol revocation to take

effect in the future has never had such result as it

is

only a declaration of what the testator intends to do.
If the laxity and uncertainty of the early formalities which
were allowed to affect the will were recognized to-day wills
would be practically useless and there would be no settled
doctrine,

and to avoid this evil the English statute of

Frauds provided the f ollowing: 'That no devise
oflads, tenements,

and heridibamentp,

,

in writing,

or any clause there-

of shall be revocable otherlwise than by some other will or
codicil in writing or other writing declaring the same or
some burning, cancellation,
by the testator himself,
tions and consent.

tearing or obliterating the same

or in his presence or by his direc-

But it

continues unless altered by some

other will ar codicil in writing, or other writing of devisor sig&d in

presence of three
the or more creditable wit-

nesses declaring the same.'

And by the same act,'No will

I0

in writing concerning personal estate shall

be repealed,

or any clause or bequest therein altered by words or will
by words of mouth only except the ssme be, in the life of
the testator

,

committed to writing and read to and allowed

by him, and proved to be done by three witnesses

.'

The legislation of most of our states on this subject is based upon this provision.

According to the word-

ing of the statute the instrunent revoking the will must be
4

sigiwd in the presence of witness.

This q the same re-

quirment fNa** in executing a will has been held to be sufficient if the testator acknowledges the signature to be his in
their presence.
A will devising real estate cannot be revoked by an
instr~ment not executed with the same formalities.
Borland 14 Mass. 208.)

(Rjo vs.

The judge says,"Our statutes on

this point are a literal copy from the English statute of
Wills andhas been repeatedly decided ani is perfectly~in
Engladd that a~will whereby alands or a disposition of,
as the case here,

to amount to a revocation a d'ormer one

must be such a one as would be effectual to pass lands with
the devising cl ause of this statute nnd must be witnessed

II
and otherwise qualifielas that clause requires.'
The s+atutes in all tjie states seem to agree that
a will

,(damise

burning, cancellation,
testator.

or codicil can be revoked by

in a willl

destroying or obliterating it by thd

The destruction of the instrument then by a third

person without the testator'S consent or knowledge whether
iwould

before or after hiP death

In Early vs. Early 5 Red.

not be a revocation.
5, The court said,'A

testator cannot delegate his power of revocation by inserting in the wil

a clause which confers on another an author-

ity to destroy it

after death.'

The statutes in moot states provide, that this burn-.
can be done by some other person

ing, cancellation,

etc.,

in his presence.

( 45 Barb. 438 Timon vs. Claffy)

In this case the jury found that a will was destroyed by the
testator's wife at his request and that it was so destroy
ed in his life time and in his presence and not fraudulently
The court held, "A testato has the right, while in the full
posse'ssion of his faculties,

to destroy his own will or any

time or in any manner he pleases,

and no fraud can be commit-

ted by a person in destroying or in assistin

to destroy
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a will by the express directiin and in the presence of the
testator, though it be not done in the presence of two witnesses, so as to revoke it.'
The statutes in Delaware have gone so far as to pro
vide that

this can be done even in the absence of the

testator if by his direction but when the will is thus destrowed the fact of the destruction and the intentconsent
I"aS

and direction of the testator^be shown by two witnesses.
,Whitever the means used in the destruction of the
will it must be done with a clear and defined intention of
the testator to revoke the same.

Thus to use Lord Mans-

field's illustration:"If a man were to throw ink upon his
instead of sand
will there would be no revokation of the will although the
writing was irrecoverably gone unless it was done with the
intention of revoking the will.'

A good examply is where

a will is torn up under a mistaken inpression that it is
invalid and then the parts gathered up and preserved.
was held to be a

This

valid will and to remain in full force in

the case of Burns vs. Burns 4 S & R. 47.

So it would

follow thai. the accidental destruction of a will would lack
the animus r'evocandi of the testator and in no case amountr 6
a revocation.
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The question of the revocation is not so easily
disposed of where the burning , cancellation, or tearing is
incomplete, where the full intention of the testator was
not carried out.
ject was Bibb vs.

One of the first cpses upon thjs
Thomas, 2 BI. I043;

sub-

In this case a tes-

tator ordered his will to bp brought to him.

He opened

and threw it contemptously upon the fire.

But falling off

it lay where it must soon have been burned

had not a woman2

in the room picked it up and put it in her pocket*

The

writing was still legible, the will haveing been but slight
ly injured.
ion

Held to be within the statute and the revocat-

was complete.

There is snother early English case which

seems tobe inconsistent with that of Bibb vs. Thomas,
( Doe vs. Harris) 6 Ad. & El. 209; in this case a testator,
who also intended to destroy his will threw it on to the
fire from which some one rescued it in a similar manner, but
with

only a corner of the envolope which containedd the

will burned.
The revocation was held incomplete.
The
co-t in reconciling these decisions seems to
have given
great weight to the fact that one will was partly burned,

14
while the other was only scorched,

the envelope protecting

This seems to be very po or reascning.

it.

The better

ground and the one upon which the cases are now decided
would be to adopt the intention of the testator as a criterIf it was his intention to destroy, this should gov-

ion.

ern even though the destruction was not complete.
should be sufficient to satisfy the law.
there was an intention to

destroy

,

This

In both cases

but in the first case

the testator threw the will in the fire and supposed it was
destroyed; while in the/second case he intending apparentlyo
!

1 0

1h
AM~%"h2

1

destroy the will Athrew it

on the fire bbut ]mew of its sub-

sequent rescue and that the party rescuing had the will in
his possession.
tion.

The testator did not carry out his inten-

He knew the will was not destroyed and hence there

was ronileted intention forthe testator relied upon the
promise of the rescuing party to subsequently destroy the
same.

In White vs. Costen I JOnes L. 197 the testator

threw the will on thp fire intending to destroy and revoke
it.

The will was burned through in three places wi+hout

interefering with the writing.

The will was rescued

15
and preserved without his knowledge but the court held it
to be a sufficient revocation.
The general rule in nearly all of the states is,
that a will m ay be revoked by some other writing signed
attested and xxkx acknowledged in like manner as a will.
In some of the states a subsequent will or codicil must expressely revoke the former will while in others the mere making of the subsequent will is a sufficient revocation.
in Ne

York thn- rule is that

a subsequent will or codicil

duly' executed will revoke all former wills made by the test
tator.

Thus in the case of Ludlum vs. Otis 15 Hun 410,

a testator executed a will whereby he devised his interest
in a house and lot in New York city to his cousin.
wards in Switzerland, he executed,
laws of the state of

After-

in accordance with the

New York a second will whereby after

giving certain legacies to his servants, he devised the
remainder of his property, all situated or invested in America, to his natural heirs.
express

The second will did not in any

terms revoke the first but it was held that the

fir st will being in consistent therewith, was revoked by the
seod
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No man can die with two testaments.

If he die

leaving two in existence the one last in point of time
contains the true expression of his intentions and thereforp is his only will

.

Williams on Exec.

in New Yor"r the later will though

But even

well executed only

revokes the earlier will in so far as it is inconsistent
therewith unless of course the revocation be expressed.
By the statutes of most of the states the birth of
posthumous child or the
birth of children after the making of the
will and during thd life of the father, will inherit as if'
contains
some provishe had died intestate unless the will
ion for them or they are particularly referred to in it.
The will is thus revoked pro tanto.

The statutes

in several of the states go further and give the

same

relief to, all children &who have not been provided for in the
will or to whom advancements have not been previously made
unless the omission in the will appears to have been intentional.
after

In Virginnia and Kentucky the birth of a child a
the making of a will if there were no former children

revokes the will unless the child dies unmarried
infant.

or an

If the testator had children previously the birth

operates as a revocation pro tauto.
In some of the

states the will is revoked by marr-

iage alone.
By the New York Revised statutes a will which disposes of the whole estate is revoked by the subsequent marriage of the testator and the birth of issue, where the wife
or the issue shall be living at the testator's death and
is unprovided for, unless so mentioned in the will as to
show an intention to make no provision.

Whether the order

of the events of marriage and birth is important, the cases
do not clearly decide.
it

Under a similar statute in England

was held in 4 Vesey 48 that t he rule is satisfied by the

birth of a child subsequent to the will, by a first wife
followed by the testators re-marriage.

It has been held'

that a will making no provision for the future birth of a
child although it

did for a future wife was revoked never-

the less by the birth of a child.
In short
America, that it

,

statute expressions vary so greatly in

seems impossible to extract from our cases

a uniform doctrine.
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The legal presumption is when a will has been properly mxect ed, with all the formalities required by the
statute that it continues to exist until the death of the
.testator

However this rpoof may always be rebutted

.

by actual proof of its revocation.
pg.e 680.

Grefnleaf on Evidence

But it appears that it has been held in Vermont

that if a will which was duly executed and. properly published cannot be found after the death of its maker, its absence
willtamount, prima facie to proof of revocation.

But the

presumption being one of fact, may bp rebutted and the will
established by proof of its contents.

14 Vermont

125.

0

So.teoin absence if all proof as to who destroyed the will
this presumption will prevail.

I Grattan 286.

Revocation is a question of intention and the acts,
conduct and declarations of the maker of the will are cndmiss.
ible for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was revoked.
The fact of revocation msy be established by circumstantial
evidence as well as by positive proof.
revocation is a

question of law.

What amounts to

2 Head 164.

Where the animnus revocandi is doubtful, the onus

19
of proving it is upon the party who alleges it.

6 Met.

282.
Th, revocation of a will by mere inference of law
ir presumption is limited to few instances.

In general

the will can only be revoked by express intpntion of the
testator or by such acts as clearly and conclusively evince
such an intention.

If from the facts we are unable to

spell out an intention the will remains in full force and
effect liable only to modification in thos. particulars
wherein the testator has trangressed the will of the state,
which in certain instances restrains him from neglecting
those who are the natural objects of his bounty.

